Preferences for Employment Protection and the Insider-Outsider Divide

Elvire Guillaud and Paul Marx ()
Additional contact information
Paul Marx: University of Bonn

No 7569, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Insider-outsider theory suggests that in dual labour markets two groups have opposing preferences regarding protection against dismissals: insiders defend employment protection, because it increases their rents. Outsiders see it as a mobility barrier and demand deregulation. Similar divides are expected for unemployment benefits: as insiders and outsiders have diverging unemployment risks, they should demand different levels of protection. Although these views are influential in the political economy debate, there is little empirical research on the effect of contract types on social and labour market policy preferences. We use a novel data set collected in the most recent presidential contest in France, which combines detailed information on respondents' employment status with questions measuring attitudes towards dismissal regulation and other labour market policies. Going beyond insider-outsider theory, we argue and show empirically that the effect of membership in either segment is moderated by the employment situation in workers' occupation.

Keywords: political preferences; insider-outsider theory; employment protection; single employment contract; France (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J08 J41 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2013-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - revised version published in: West European Politics, 2014, 37 (5), 1177-1185

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Related works:
Working Paper: Preferences for employment protection and the insider-outsider divide (2014)
Working Paper: Preferences for employment protection and the insider-outsider divide (2014)
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