Health Status, Disability and Retirement Incentives in Belgium

Alain Jousten, Mathieu Lefebvre and Sergio Perelman

No 7783, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Many Belgian retire well before the statutory retirement age. Numerous exit routes from the labor force can be identified: old-age pensions, conventional early retirement, disability insurance, and unemployment insurance are the most prominent ones. We analyze the retirement decision of Belgian workers adopting an option value framework, and pay special attention to the role of health status. We estimate probit models of retirement using data from SHARE. The results show that health and incentives matter in the decision to exit from the labor market. Based on these results, we simulate the effect of potential reforms on retirement.

Keywords: unemployment; early retirement; disability; social security; pensions; labor force participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H55 J14 J21 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2013-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Chapter: Health Status, Disability, and Retirement Incentives in Belgium (2014)
Working Paper: Health Status, Disability and Retirement Incentives in Belgium (2014)
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