Incentive Pay and Performance: Insider Econometrics in a Multi-Unit Firm

Hein Bogaard () and Jan Svejnar
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Hein Bogaard: George Washington University

No 7800, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We exploit organizational reforms in a foreign-owned bank in Central-East Europe to study the implementation of modern HRM policies in an emerging market context. We have branch-level data and use our knowledge of the process that led to the adoption of the reforms to implement two estimators that address endogeneity bias in a complementary fashion: an IV approach and Generalized Propensity Score estimation. Our results show that some of the reforms had a positive impact on productivity, but they also underscore the risks of quantity-based incentives where quality is important.

Keywords: banking; foreign ownership; incentives; endogeneity of HRM policies; insider econometrics; Central and Eastern Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 G21 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2013-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-eff, nep-hrm, nep-lab and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published - published in: Labour Economics, 2018, 54, 100 - 115

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentive pay and performance: Insider econometrics in a multi-unit firm (2018)
Working Paper: Incentive Pay and Performance: Insider Econometrics in a Multi-Unit Firm (2014)
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