Trust and In-Group Favoritism in a Culture of Crime

Stephan Meier (), Lamar Pierce () and Antonino Vaccaro ()
Additional contact information
Stephan Meier: Columbia University
Lamar Pierce: Washington University, St. Louis
Antonino Vaccaro: University of Navarra

No 8169, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We use experiments in high schools in two neighborhoods in the metropolitan area of Palermo, Italy to experimentally demonstrate that the historical informal institution of organized crime can undermine current institutions, even in religiously and ethnically homogeneous populations. Using trust and prisoner's dilemma games, we found that students in a neighborhood with high Mafia involvement exhibit lower generalized trust and trustworthiness, but higher in-group favoritism, with punishment norms failing to resolve these deficits. Our study suggests that a culture of organized crime can affect adolescent norms and attitudes that might support a vicious cycle of in-group favoritism and crime that in turn hinders economic development.

Keywords: in-group favoritism; trust; organized crime; Mafia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 67 pages
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-law and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published - published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2016, 132 (Part A), 78-92

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