Privacy, time consistent optimal labor income taxation and education policy

Kai Konrad

No 82, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Incomplete information is a commitment device for time consistency problems. In the contextof time consistent labor income taxation privacy can lead to a Pareto superior outcome and increases the effectiveness of public education as a second best policy.

Keywords: Privacy; time consistent income taxation; commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1999-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published - published in: Journal of Public Economics, 2001, 79(3), 503-519

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Working Paper: Privacy, Time Consistent Optimal Labour Income Taxation and Education Policy (1999)
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