Income Receipt and Mortality: Evidence from Swedish Public Sector Employees
Elvira Andersson (),
Petter Lundborg () and
Johan Vikström ()
No 8389, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
In this paper, we study the short-run effect of salary receipt on mortality among Swedish public sector employees. By exploiting variation in pay-days across work-places, we completely control for mortality patterns related to, for example, public holidays and other special days or events coinciding with paydays and for general within-month and within-week mortality patterns. We find a dramatic increase in mortality on the day salaries arrive. The increase is especially pronounced for younger workers and for deaths due to activity-related causes such as heart conditions and strokes. Additionally, the effect is entirely driven by an increase in mortality among low income individuals, who are more likely to experience liquidity constraints. All things considered, our results suggest that an increase in general economic activity upon salary receipt is an important cause of the excess mortality.
Keywords: income; mortality; health; consumption; liquidity constraints; permanent income hypothesis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H31 H55 I10 I12 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-eur, nep-hea and nep-hrm
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Journal Article: Income receipt and mortality — Evidence from Swedish public sector employees (2015)
Working Paper: Income receipt and mortality - evidence from Swedish public sector employees (2014)
Working Paper: Income Receipt and Mortality – Evidence from Swedish Public Sector Employees (2014)
Working Paper: Income receipt and mortality - Evidence from Swedish public sector employees (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8389
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