Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Eugenio Proto, Aldo Rustichini () and Andis Sofianos ()
Additional contact information
Aldo Rustichini: University of Minnesota
Andis Sofianos: Heidelberg University

No 8499, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Intelligence affects social outcomes of groups. A systematic study of the link is provided in an experiment where two groups of subjects with different levels of intelligence, but otherwise similar, play a repeated prisoner's dilemma. The initial cooperation rates are similar, it increases in the groups with higher intelligence to reach almost full cooperation, while declining in the groups with lower intelligence. The difference is produced by the cumulation of small but persistent differences in the response to past cooperation of the partner. In higher intelligence subjects, cooperation after the initial stages is immediate and becomes the default mode, defection instead requires more time. For lower intelligence groups this difference is absent. Cooperation of higher intelligence subjects is payoff sensitive, thus not automatic: in a treatment with lower continuation probability there is no difference between different intelligence groups.

Keywords: cooperation; repeated prisoner dilemma; intelligence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published - Extended version published as 'Intelligence Personality and Gains from Cooperation in Repeated Interactions' in: Journal of Political Economy, 2019, 127 (3), 1351-1390

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Related works:
Working Paper: Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (2015)
Working Paper: Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (2015)
Working Paper: Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (2015)
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