Intrahousehold Decision Making and Fertility

Matthias Doepke and Fabian Kindermann

No 8726, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: The economic theory of fertility choice builds predominantly on the unitary model of the household, in which there is a single household utility function and potential intra-household disagreement is abstracted from. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that many (potential) mothers and fathers disagree on whether to have children, on how many children to have, and on when to have them. In this paper, we review existing work that brings models of intrahousehold conflict and bargaining to bear on fertility choice, and we point out promising future directions for this line of research.

Keywords: limited commitment; child care; bargaining; fertility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 J12 J13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published - published in: M. Cervellati, U. Sunde (eds.), Demographic Change and Long-Run Development, MIT Press, 2017,

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