The Short- and Long-Run Effects of Private Law Enforcement: Evidence from University Police

Paul Heaton (), Priscillia Hunt, John MacDonald () and Jessica Saunders ()
Additional contact information
Paul Heaton: RAND
John MacDonald: University of Pennsylvania
Jessica Saunders: RAND

No 8800, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Over a million people in the United States are employed in private security and law enforcement, yet very little is known about the effects of private police on crime. The current study examines the relationship between a privately-funded university police force and crime in a large U.S. city. Following an expansion of the jurisdictional boundary of the private police force, we see no short-term change in crime. However, using a geographic regression discontinuity approach, we find large impacts of private police on public safety, with violent crime in particular decreasing. These contradictory results appear to be a consequence of delayed effect of private police on crime.

Keywords: law enforcement; privately provided public good; crime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: The Short- and Long-Run Effects of Private Law Enforcement: Evidence from University Police (2016)
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