Bargaining and Wage Rigidity in a Matching Model for the US

James Malcomson and Sophocles Mavroeidis

No 8806, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: The Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching model with all wages negotiated each period is shown inconsistent with macroeconomic wage dynamics in the US. This applies even when heterogeneous match productivities, time to build vacancies and credible bargaining are incorporated. Wage rigidity consistent with micro evidence that wages of job changers are more flexible than those of job stayers allows the model to capture these dynamics and is not inconsistent with parameter calibrations in the literature. Such wage rigidity affects only the timing of wage payments over the duration of matches, so conclusions about characteristics based on calibrations continue to apply.

Keywords: wage bargaining; matching frictions; wage rigidity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E2 J3 J6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-lab, nep-lma, nep-ltv and nep-mac
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Published - published in: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 2017, 79 (6), 997-1017

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Journal Article: Bargaining and Wage Rigidity in a Matching Model for the US (2017)
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