EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Charters Without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston

Atila Abdulkadiroglu (), Joshua Angrist (), Peter Hull () and Parag Pathak
Additional contact information
Atila Abdulkadiroglu: Duke University

No 8985, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Lottery estimates suggest oversubscribed urban charter schools boost student achievement markedly. But these estimates needn't capture treatment effects for students who haven't applied to charter schools or for students attending charters for which demand is weak. This paper reports estimates of the effects of charter school attendance on middle-schoolers in charter takeovers in New Orleans and Boston. Takeovers are traditional public schools that close and then re-open as charter schools. Students enrolled in schools designated for closure are eligible for "grandfathering" into the new schools; that is, they are guaranteed seats. We use this fact to construct instrumental variables estimates of the effects of passive charter attendance: the grandfathering instrument compares students at schools designated for takeover with students who appear similar at baseline and who were attending similar schools not yet closed, while adjusting for possible violations of the exclusion restriction in such comparisons. Estimates for a large sample of takeover schools in the New Orleans Recovery School District show substantial gains from takeover enrollment. In Boston, where we can compare grandfathering and lottery estimates for a middle school, grandfathered students see achievement gains at least as large as the gains for students assigned seats in lotteries. A non-charter Boston turnaround intervention that had much in common with the charter treatment generates gains as large as those seen for takeovers, but other more modest turnaround interventions produce much smaller effects.

Keywords: instrumental variables; education reform; education production; compliers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C26 C36 I21 I28 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69 pages
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp8985.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Charters without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Charters Without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8985

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().

 
Page updated 2022-10-04
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8985