Building Trust in Rural Producer Organizations in Senegal: Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial
Markus Frölich (),
Andreas Landmann (),
Pia Naima Unte (),
Angelino Viceisza () and
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Andreas Landmann: Paris School of Economics
Pia Naima Unte: University of Mannheim
No 9207, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Trust is crucial for successful collective action. A prime example is collective commercialization of agricultural produce through producer organizations. We conduct a cluster-randomized controlled trial in rural Senegal in which we vary the number and the type of smallholder farmers – members and/or leaders of local producer organizations – invited to a three-day training on collective commercialization. We use this variation to identify effects on intra-group trust, both direct treatment effects of having participated in the training and spillover effects on farmers who did not partake. Looking at different measures of trust in leaders' competence and motives and of trust in members we find that participating in the training significantly enhances both trust in leaders and trust in members. For trust in leaders, we also find a strong spillover effect. Our findings suggest that relatively soft and non-costly interventions such as a group training appear to be able to positively affect trust within producer organizations.
Keywords: rural producer organizations; smallholder farmers; trust; Senegal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 O12 Q13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 64 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Working Paper: Building trust in rural producers organizations in Senegal: results from a randomized controlled trial (2015)
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