When Incentives Backfire: Spillover Effects in Food Choice
Manuela Angelucci,
Silvia Prina (),
Heather Royer and
Anya Samek
Additional contact information
Silvia Prina: Northeastern University
No 9288, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
How do peers influence the impact of incentives? Despite much work on incentives, little is known about the spillover effects of incentives. We investigate two mechanisms by which these effects can occur: through peers' actions and peers' incentives. In a field experiment on snack choice (grapes versus cookies), we randomize who receives incentives, the fraction of peers incentivized, and whether or not it can be observed that peers' choices are incentivized among over 1,500 children in the school lunchroom. Incentives increase the likelihood of initially choosing grapes. However, peer spillover effects can be large enough to undo these positive effects.
Keywords: field experiment; spillovers; incentives; food choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 I1 J13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-ger and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
Published - published in: American Economic Review: Economic Policy, 2019, 11 (4), 66 - 95
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https://docs.iza.org/dp9288.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: When incentives backfire: Spillover effects in food choice (2016) 
Working Paper: When Incentives Backfire: Spillover Effects in Food Choice (2015) 
Working Paper: When Incentives Backfire: Spillover Effects in Food Choice (2015) 
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