An Experimental Study of Voting with Costly Delay

Maksymilian Kwiek, Helia Marreiros () and Michael Vlassopoulos

No 9336, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached. We study experimentally welfare properties of simple three-voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs. The resulting game is a form of multiplayer war of attrition. Our key finding is that, consistent with theoretical predictions, when voters are ex ante heterogeneous in terms of the intensity of their preferences the conclave leads to efficiency gains relative to simple majority voting. We also compare welfare properties of a static versus a dynamic version of a conclave. When social cost of waiting is taken into account, the dynamic conclave is superior in terms of welfare than its static version.

Keywords: voting; supermajority; intensity of preferences; war of attrition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Economics Letters, 2016, 140, 23-26.

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp9336.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: An experimental study of voting with costly delay (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9336

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().