What Drives the Legalization of Immigrants? Evidence from IRCA

Alessandra Casarico, Giovanni Facchini and Tommaso Frattini

No 9666, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We develop a model to understand the trade-offs faced by an elected representative in supporting an amnesty when a restrictive immigration policy is in place. We show that an amnesty is more desirable the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on the voting behavior of U.S. Congressmen on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provides strong support for the predictions of our theoretical model.

Keywords: migration policy; amnesties; democracy; roll call votes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 O51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mig
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - published in: Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2018, 70, 258-27

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Related works:
Journal Article: What drives the legalization of immigrants? Evidence from IRCA (2018)
Working Paper: What drives the legalization of immigrants? Evidence from IRCA (2018)
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