Gradual Collective Wage Bargaining

Sabien Dobbelaere and Roland Iwan Luttens ()
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Roland Iwan Luttens: University of Amsterdam

No 9691, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper presents an alternative implementation of firm-level collective wage bargaining, where bargaining proceeds as a finite sequence of sessions between a firm and a union of variable size. We investigate the impact of such a 'gradual' union on the wage-employment contract in an economy with concave production. In a static framework, the resulting equilibrium is equivalent to the efficient bargaining outcome. In a dynamic framework with search frictions, we demonstrate that gradual collective wage bargaining coincides with all-or-nothing bargaining when bargaining takes place in fictitious time before production.

Keywords: firm; gradual union; collective bargaining; search frictions; employment-at-will (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 J41 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2016-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - published in: Labour Economics, 2016, 40, 37-42

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Journal Article: Gradual collective wage bargaining (2016)
Working Paper: Gradual Collective Wage Bargaining (2016)
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