Compensation Preferences of R&D-Suppliers - Some Empirical Results

Martin Kloyer (), Roland Helm and Wolfgang Burr
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Martin Kloyer: University of Jena, Faculty of Economics

No 13/2004, Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) from Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: R&D suppliers who are not compensated according to their preferences are motivated to behave opportunistically. The paper presents empirical findings about these preferences. The investigation is based on the assumption that the probability of a continuous compensation instead of a final payment increases when the negotiation power of the supplier rises. The results confirm this presumption with regard to the power determinants of effective intellectual property rights and the number of cooperation alternatives. In contrast to that: suppliers who control the complementary assets themselves, have no explicit preference.

Keywords: R&D; Contract R&D; Opportunism; Compensation Preferences; Negotiation Power; Resource Dependence Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06
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Published as "Compensation Preferences of R&D-Suppliers: Some Empirical Results" in: International Journal of Technology Management, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2007), S. 371-387

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jen:jenasw:2004-13

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