Sanctions and public opinion: the case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes

William Seitz and Alberto Zazzaro ()

No 762, IDE Discussion Papers from Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO)

Abstract: Economic sanctions usually fail, sometimes even provoking the opposite of the intended outcome. Why are sanctions so often ineffective? One prominent view is that sanctions generate popular support for the targeted government and its policies; an outcome referred to as the rally-around-the-flag effect. We quantify this effect in the context of a major trade dispute between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which led to a cut in gas exports to Ukraine and a sharp increase of gas prices. Using individual data on political and economic preferences before and after the trade dispute and exploiting the cross section heterogeneity in the individual exposure to the price shock—measured by the connection to a centralized gas/heating system—we find that people more directly affected by the increase of gas prices were significantly more likely to change their opinions in support of Western-style political and economic systems preferred by the incumbent government, consistent with a rally-around-the-flag effect.

Keywords: Sanctions; Gas Dispute; Russia; Ukraine; Rally-Around-the-Flag (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in IDE Discussion Paper = IDE Discussion Paper, No. 762. 2019-05

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https://ir.ide.go.jp/record/51386/files/IDP000762_001.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sanctions and public opinion: The case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes (2020)
Working Paper: Sanctions and Public Opinion: The Case of the Russia-Ukraine Gas Disputes (2019)
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