Immigration and Majority Voting on Income Redistriubtion-Is there a Case for Opposition from Natives?

Karin Mayr-Dorn

No 2003-08, Economics working papers from Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

Abstract: This paper examines the effect of immigration on the level of income redistribution via majority voting on the income tax. As a main result, we derive multiple tax equilibria if immigrants are allowed to vote and the skill composition of natives is not too homogeneous. In this case, the outcome of a native referendum on giving immigrants the right to vote would be negative, since immigrants could overthrow the native majority and change the tax rate that is utility-maximising for natives. It is found that at best, natives are indifferent towards immigrant voting, and the outcome of a corresponding referendum would be indeterminate.

Keywords: Political Economy; Immigration; Income Redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F22 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jku:econwp:2003_08

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