All-pay auctions with budget constraints and fair insurance

Uwe Dulleck, Paul Frijters and Konrad Podczeck
Additional contact information
Konrad Podczeck: University of Vienna

No 2006-13, Economics working papers from Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

Abstract: We study all-pay auctions with budget-constrained bidders who have access to fair insurance before bidding simultaneously over a prize. We characterize a unique equilibrium for the special cases of two bidders and one prize, show existence and a heuristic for finding an equilibrium in the case of multiple bidders and multiple prizes. We end with an example of non-uniqueness of equilibria for the general case of multiple prizes and multiple players.

Keywords: all-pay auctions; fair lotteries; political campaigning; oligopoly; regional competition; patent races (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D42 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.econ.jku.at/papers/2006/wp0613.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: All-pay Auctions with Budget Constraints and Fair Insurance (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jku:econwp:2006_13

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