Divorce and the Excess Burden of Lawyers

Martin Halla

No 2007-13, Economics working papers from Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

Abstract: We present a model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers in their divorce process. Spouses encounter incentives as in the classical prisoners’ dilemma: Despite the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers’ fees, each spouse has an incentive to hire a lawyer. We propose a simple institutional setting allowing for joint lawyers in order to overcome this socially inefficient situation. This model is estimated and tested with rich micro-data from court records. Employing a multiple treatment matching procedure we estimate the causal effect of lawyers on the division of matrimonial property, on the length of the divorce process and on the quality of the divorce settlement.

Keywords: litigation; lawyers; divorce settlements; dispute resolution; family law; multiple treatment matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 J12 J52 K36 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Divorce and the Excess Burden of Lawyers (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jku:econwp:2007_13

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