The Link between the Intrinsic Motivation to Comply and Compliance Behavior – A Critical Appraisal of Existing Evidence
Martin Halla
No 2010-03, Economics working papers from Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria
Abstract:
Recent economic literature emphasizes the importance of moral considerations to explain compliance behavior with respect to underground activities such as tax evasion. A considerable amount of research aims to identify factors that affect the intrinsic motivation to comply. However, the causal link between the intrinsic motivation to comply and actual compliance behavior is not established yet. We provide a discussion of the underlying identification problem and suggest (potentially) feasible empirical strategies to uncover a causal effect.
Keywords: Shadow economy; tax evasion; tax compliance; benefit fraud; tax morale; benefit morale; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C81 H26 O17 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2010-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
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http://www.econ.jku.at/papers/2010/wp1003.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Chapter: The Link between the Intrinsic Motivation to Comply and Compliance Behaviour: A Critical Appraisal of Existing Evidence (2011) 
Working Paper: The Link between the Intrinsic Motivation to Comply and Compliance Behavior: A Critical Appraisal of Existing Evidence (2010) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jku:econwp:2010_03
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