The Napoleon complex revisited
Mario Lackner
No 2024-06, Economics working papers from Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria
Abstract:
We analyse evaluation biases caused by physical attributes. Using data from German elite soccer, we find that referees are more inclined to sanction players when the difference in body size is sufficiently large. Moreover, we document an 'inverse Napoleon effect' in situations when the referee is confronted with smaller players, suggesting that sanctions are used as a substitute for authority gained by stature in the industry. Further analyses reveal that referees discriminate less against more talented players and teams with a higher concentration of these players. Finally, we find that the bias is reduced but still exists for the group of more experienced referees.
Keywords: evaluation; discrimination; social dominance; referee bias; soccer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J71 L83 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-spo
Note: English
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jku:econwp:2024-06
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