Less fighting than expected - experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions

Hannah Hörisch and Oliver Kirchkamp
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Hannah Hörisch: University of Munich
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Hannah Schildberg-Hoerisch ()

No 2008-023, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We use experiments to compare dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second-price all-pay auctions) and first-price all-pay auctions. Many other studies find overbidding in first-price all-pay auctions. We can replicate this property. In wars of attrition, however, we find systematic underbidding. We study bids and revenue in different experimental frames and matching procedures and draw a link to the literature on stepwise linear bidding functions.

Keywords: War of attrition; dynamic bidding; all-pay auction; stabilisation; volunteer's dilemma; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D44 E62 H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-023

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