Less fighting than expected — experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions

Oliver Kirchkamp

No 607, CRIEFF Discussion Papers from Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm

Abstract: The paper compares with the help of experiments dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second price all-pay auctions) and first-price all-pay auctions. While most experimental studies find overbidding in first-price all-pay auctions, we find underbidding in a similar institution, the war of attrition, in particular if the bidding process is dynamic. We study bids and revenue in different experimental frames and matching procedures and draw a link to the literature on stepwise linear bidding functions

Keywords: War of attrition; dynamic bidding; all-pay auction; stabilisation; volunteer’s dilemma; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D44 E62 H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Less fighting than expected - experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:san:crieff:0607

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