Contracts and Promises - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements

Topi Miettinen

No 2008-088, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on whether actions are strategic complements or substitutes. With strategic substitutes, there is a conflict between Pareto-efficiency and the incentives to abide. The opposite tends to be true when actions are strategic complements. The results are interpreted in the context of legal contracts and in that of informal mutual promises.

Keywords: partnerships; contracts; pre-play communication; legal enforcement; social norms; guilt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 K12 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-gth and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: Contracts and Promises - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-088

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