Generosity, Greed and Gambling: What difference does asymmetric information in bargaining make?

Charlotte Klempt and Kerstin Pull

No 2009-021, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning the size of a pie on proposer behavior in three different bargaining situations: the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game. Our data show that (a) irrespective of the information condition, proposer generosity increases with responder veto power, (b) informed proposers in the ultimatum game try to exploit their superior information and hide their greed by a seemingly fair offer, and (c) uninformed proposers in the dictator game exhibit gambling behavior by asking for more than potentially is at stake. While the results of our experimental analysis are interesting as such, they may also yield interesting practical implications.

Keywords: Bargaining; Information; Experimental Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-021

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