Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries

Hans-Peter Weikard, Leo Wangler and Andreas Freytag ()
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Leo Wangler: Department of Economics, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany

No 2009-077, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreeme

Keywords: Minimum participation rules; international environmental agreements; coalition formation; transboundary pollution; environmental policy coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D62 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-env
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published as "Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries", in: Environmental and Resource Economics 62 (2015), 711-727.

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Journal Article: Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-077

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