Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries

Hans-Peter Weikard, Leo Wangler () and Andreas Freytag ()

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2015, vol. 62, issue 4, 727 pages

Abstract: Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyse a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreements. While a full participation requirement would be efficient, we find (sequential) equilibria with a minimum participation rule that allows at least one country to free ride. Free riding may occur if a country can exploit some bargaining power in the negotiation of the minimum participation rule. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Keywords: Minimum participation rules; International environmental agreements; Coalition formation; Transboundary pollution; Environmental policy coordination; D62; H41; D02; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Working Paper: Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries (2009)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-014-9861-1

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