Unravelling conditional cooperation - Reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring in public goods provision

Dominique Cappelletti, Werner Güth () and Matteo Ploner

No 2011-047, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Extensive research on human cooperation in social dilemmas has shown that individuals condition their behaviour upon the behaviour of others. However, few attempts have been made to disentangle the motivations backing conditional cooperation. We try to assess the relative importance of three motives - namely reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring - in a non-linear voluntary contribution experiment. We find that, for those conditionally cooperating, both reciprocity and inequity aversion represent relevant motivational factors, but the impact of inequity aversion is stronger than that of reciprocity. In contrast, anchoring plays only a marginal role. Compared to what previously found in linear voluntary contribution games, overall we find much less conditional cooperation. In a control treatment with a less complex design, conditional cooperation is higher but still comparatively low.

Keywords: Conditional cooperation; Experimental Economics; Public Goods; Social Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10-17
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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