Broken Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence

Andreas Leibbrandt, Abhijit Ramalingam, Lauri Sääksvuori and James Walker

No 2012-004, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents who are linked through alternative punishment networks. We find that the structure of the punishment network significantly impacts contributions to the public good, but not overall efficiencies. Contributions collapse over decision rounds in groups with limited punishment opportunities, even if the absolute punishment capacity corresponds to the complete punishment network where all agents are allowed to punish each other. However, after allowing for the costs of sanctions, efficiencies are similar across the different networks that allow for punishment and the no-punishment network.

Keywords: public goods experiment; punishment; cooperation; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D01 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-004

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