Sorting via Screening versus Signaling: A Theoretic and Experimental Comparison

Werner Güth () and Fabian Winter

No 2013-017, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Similar to Kübler et al. (2008, GEB 64, p. 219-236), we compare sorting in games with asymmetric incomplete information theoretically and experimentally. Rather than distinguishing two very different sequential games, we use the same game format and capture the structural difference of screening and signaling only via their payoff specification. The experiment thus relies on the same verbal instructions. Although the equilibrium outcomes coincide, greater efficiency losses off the equilibrium play due to sorting under signaling, compared to screening, is predicted and confirmed experimentally.

Keywords: sorting; screening; signaling; wage bargaining; off-equilibrium play (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D82 J24 J40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ltv
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-017

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