A hybrid game with conditional and unconditional veto power

Werner Güth (), Maria Levati, Natalia Montinari () and Chiara Nardi

No 2014-015, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.

Keywords: Ultimatum; Yes/No game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2014/wp_2014_015.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Hybrid Game with Conditional and Unconditional Veto Power (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-015

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Markus Pasche ().