A hybrid game with conditional and unconditional veto power
Werner Güth (),
Maria Levati (),
Natalia Montinari () and
No 2014-015, Jena Economic Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.
Keywords: Ultimatum; Yes/No game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Working Paper: A Hybrid Game with Conditional and Unconditional Veto Power (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-015
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