Collective choices under ambiguity

Maria Levati, Stefan Napel and Ivan Soraperra

No 2014-019, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We investigate experimentally whether collective choice matters for individual attitudes to ambiguity. We consider a two-urn Ellsberg experiment: one urn offers a 45% chance of winning a fixed monetary prize, the other an ambiguous chance. Participants choose either individually or in groups of three. Group decision rules vary. In one treatment the collective choice is taken by majority; in another it is dictated by two group members; in the third it is dictated by a single group member. We observe high proportions of ambiguity averse choices in both individual and collective decision making. Although a majority of participants display consistent ambiguity attitudes across their decisions, collective choice tends to foster ambiguity aversion, especially if the decision rule assigns asymmetric responsibilities to group members. Previous participation in laboratory experiments may miti- gate this.

Keywords: Ambiguity aversion; majority voting; dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D71 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Collective Choices Under Ambiguity (2017)
Working Paper: Collective choices under ambiguity (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-019

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