Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation
Sven Fischer (),
Werner Güth (),
Todd Kaplan () and
Ro'i Zultan ()
Additional contact information
Sven Fischer: Newcastle University Business School
Werner Güth: LUISS Rome, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, and Max Planck Institute on Collective Goods Bonn
No 2017-012, Jena Economic Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
(Revised Version of JERP 2014-027) In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first-price auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first-over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions generate significantly more revenue.
Keywords: auction; espionage; collusion; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2017-012
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Jena Economic Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Markus Pasche ().