The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking

Kohei Daido and Takeshi Murooka ()
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Takeshi Murooka: Osaka University

No 242, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract: We study multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible task and a non-contractible task, which are substitutes. The agent has private information on the value of the non-contractible task, and there are followers who can also contribute to this task. We highlight a new mechanism by incorporating leading-by-example (Hermalin, 1998) in a multi-tasking model. To prevent excessive effort by the agent with low value on the non-contractible task, the principal provides high-powered incentives for the contractible task. We discuss its organizational implications to pay for performance, incentives to help colleagues, and prevention of overwork.

Keywords: Multitasking; Signaling; Leadership; Pay for Performance; Help; Overwork (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-hrm
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http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp242.pdf First version, 2022 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:242

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