Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market

Keisuke Kawata () and Mizuki Komura
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Keisuke Kawata: Institute of Social Sciences, University of Tokyo

No 254, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract: This study explores the marriage matching of only child individuals and the related outcomes. Specifically, we analyze two aspects. First, we investigate the marriage patterns of only children, examining whether people choose mates in a positive or a negative assortative manner regarding only child status. This analysis reveals that, along with being more likely to remain single, only children are also more likely to marry another only child. Second, we measure the premium/penalty by the size of the gap in the partner's socioeconomic status (SES, which is defined herein as years of education) between only child and non-only child individuals. Our estimations confirm that among women who marry an only child husband, only children are penalized in terms of 0.63 years less educational attainment for the partner. Finally, we discuss the potential sources of this penalty along with our set of empirical findings.

Keywords: marriage matching; only children; gender; machine learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J11 J12 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2023-07, Revised 2025-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem
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http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp254.pdf Revised version, 2025 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:254

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