Only-Child Matching Penalty in the Marriage Market

Keisuke Kawata () and Mizuki Komura
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Keisuke Kawata: University of Tokyo

No 18198, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: This study explores the marriage matching of only-child individuals and the related outcomes. Specifically, we analyze two aspects: First, we investigate the marriage patterns of only children, examining whether people choose mates in a positive or negative assortative manner regarding only-child status. We find that, along with being more likely to remain single, only children are more likely to marry another only child. Second, we measure the matching premium or penalty using the difference in partners’ socioeconomic status, measured by years of schooling, between only-child and non–only-child individuals. Our estimates show that among women who marry an only-child husband, only children are penalized, as their partners’ educational attainment is 0.63 years lower. Finally, we discuss the potential sources of this penalty along with our empirical findings.

Keywords: gender; only children; marriage matching; machine learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J11 J12 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-gen and nep-lab
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https://docs.iza.org/dp18198.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market (2025)
Working Paper: Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18198

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