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A Note on Firms' Strategic Behaviour During an IPO

Pia Weiss () and Stefan Mai ()

No 01/2002, IWP Discussion Paper Series from Institute for Economic Policy, Cologne, Germany

Abstract: When potential shareholders cannot observe the business conditions of the firms, the latter desiring to acquire capital by an IPO and operating under less favourable business conditions have a strong incentive to appear more successful.

Keywords: IPO; asymmetric information; signalling game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent and nep-fin
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