A Note on Firms' Strategic Behaviour During an IPO

Pia Weiss ()

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: When potential shareholders cannot observe the business conditions of the firms, the latter desiring to acquire capital by an IPO and operating under less favourable business conditions have a strong incentive to appear more successful.

Keywords: IPO; asymmetric information; signalling game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2002-01-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent
Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on IBM PC; pages: 6; figures: no
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Working Paper: A Note on Firms' Strategic Behaviour During an IPO (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0201003

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