A Note on Firms' Strategic Behaviour During an IPO
Pia Weiss ()
Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
When potential shareholders cannot observe the business conditions of the firms, the latter desiring to acquire capital by an IPO and operating under less favourable business conditions have a strong incentive to appear more successful.
Keywords: IPO; asymmetric information; signalling game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent
Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on IBM PC; pages: 6; figures: no
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Working Paper: A Note on Firms' Strategic Behaviour During an IPO (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0201003
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