Bank regulation and supervision in Japan and Germany: A comparison

Ralf Bebenroth, Diemo Dietrich and Uwe Vollmer
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Uwe Vollmer: University of Leipzig, Germany

No 211, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: This paper describes and compares the regulation and supervision of banks in Japan and Germany. We have chosen these countries because they have both bank-dominated financial systems and belong to the same law tradition, yet, bank stability differs significantly. We ask to what extent these countries follow best practice regulations in banking and whether differences in banking stability and efficiency can be explained by regulatory and supervisory differences. We argue that bank regulation and supervision are less efficient in Japan than in Germany and show why Japan and Germany have made different regulatory and supervisory choices.

Keywords: Bank regulation and supervision; Banking stability and banking efficiency; Deposit insurance; Lender of last resort; Forbearance; Japan and Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-his and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Bank regulation and supervision in bank-dominated financial systems: a comparison between Japan and Germany (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kob:dpaper:211

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