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Behold the 'Behemoth'. The privatization of Japan Post Bank

Uwe Vollmer, Diemo Dietrich and Ralf Bebenroth
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Uwe Vollmer: Economics Department, University of Leipzig, Germany

No 236, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: This paper analyzes the privatization process of the Japanese Post Bank (JPB), the largest bank in the world. We report some evidence in favour of the "political view" of SOB's and argue that, before privatization, postal savings banks served as vehicles for politicians to reallocate funds in exchange for private rents. We ask why politicians in Japan decided to privatize the postal savings system, predict how the privatization will proceed and study the expected results of the privatization process. We argue that there will be no level playing field in bank competition after the start of the privatization process and discuss possible out-comes of JPB privatization on financial stability in Japan.

Keywords: Public banking; Japan; Privatization; Postal savings banks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 L32 P12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-his
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https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/dp236.pdf First version, 2009 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kob:dpaper:236

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