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On Coalitional Stability and Single-peakedness

Hirofumi Yamamura
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Hirofumi Yamamura: Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, Japan

No DP2011-21, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: We study a one-dimensional voting game in which voters choose a policy from a one-dimensional policy set over which voters have single-peaked preferences. The purpose of this paper is to analyze coalitional behaviors under any given voting mechanism. We employ the notion of strong Nash equilibrium and identify a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a voting mechanism to possess a strong Nash equilibrium by using the minimax theorem. We moreover show that any strong Nash outcome, if it exists, results in an outcome recommended by a particular augmented median voter rule.

Keywords: Single-peakedness; Augmented median voter rule; Strong Nash equilibrium; Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium; Minimax theorem; Manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-pol and nep-pub
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