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A Cash Effect in Ultimatum Game Experiments

Junyi Shen and Hiromasa Takahashi

No DP2013-13, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: This paper reports two experiments involving an ultimatum game, conducted in Japan. There were two treatments in our experiments. One was called a cash session and the other was called a point session. The cash session means introducing cash into the ultimatum game. In other words, in a cash session, subjects bargained money in cash but not points or tokens as most prior experiments did. We found that compared to those in the point sessions, proposers offered more and responders rejected less in the cash sessions. These evidences imply that a cash effect does exist in the ultimatum game experiments.

Keywords: Cash effect; Ultimatum game; Cost-loss discrepancy; Experimental design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2013-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2013-13.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)

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