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Capital Controls, Macroprudential Regulation,and the Bank Balance Sheet Channel

Shigeto Kitano () and Kenya Takaku
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Kenya Takaku: Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University, Japan

No DP2017-18, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: We incorporate a banking sector with balance sheet frictions into a model of a small open economy and compare the effectiveness of capital controls and macroprudential regulation. We show that the welfare-improving effect of capital controls is larger than that of macroprudential regulation if the degree of financial friction between domestic banks and foreign investors is high, while the welfare-improving effect of macroprudential regulation is larger than that of capital controls if the degree of financial friction is low. We also show that the welfare ranking of the two policies depends on whether an economy suffers from liability dollarization.

Keywords: Capital control; Macroprudential regulation; Financial frictions; Financial intermediaries; Balance sheets; Small open economy; Liability dollarization; DSGE; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E69 F32 F38 F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-opm
Date: 2017-10, Revised 2019-01
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https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2017-18.pdf Revised version, 2019 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2017-18

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