The Bargaining Set and Coalition Formation
No DP2021-15, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University
We address the problem of predicting how rational agents will form coalitions in a nontransferable utility game, and within each coalition how they will allocate the gains obtained through cooperation. To answer these questions, we propose solution concepts according to which the coalition structure and the payoff allocations are simultaneously determined. We prove the nonemptiness and partial efficiency of the steady bargaining set, a refinement of the Zhou bargaining set, for at least one coalition structure under the restrictive non-crossing condition. In addition, we show the nonemptiness and possible inefficiency of the Mas-Colell bargaining set if this condition is not assumed.
Keywords: Nontransferable utility game; Coalition structure; Bargaining set; Restrictive non-crossing condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Journal Article: The bargaining set and coalition formation (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2021-15
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