Simultaneous and Sequential Provision under Endowment Heterogeneity: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Xiaoping Zhao, Junyi Shen, Ken-Ichi Shimomura and Hiromasa Takahashi
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Xiaoping Zhao: Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, JAPAN
Ken-Ichi Shimomura: College of Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, and Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, JAPAN
Hiromasa Takahashi: Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University

No DP2026-28, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: We study public-good provision in a three-player environment with Cobb-Douglas preferences and heterogeneous endowments. Across treatments we vary the distribution of endowments while holding the group's total endowment constant. We conduct two comparisons: (i) within-mechanism, contrasting theoretical benchmarks with experimental outcomes; and (ii) across mechanisms, contrasting simultaneous with sequential play under the same role–endowment mapping. In the sequential mechanism, the richest participant is exogenously assigned as the leader, and the two followers move simultaneously in the second stage. Taking Varian (1994) as a testable null (sequential provision should not exceed simultaneous provision), we report both aggregate provision and role-level contributions and document alignment and gaps between theory and data within mechanisms, as well as the pure timing effect across mechanisms. This design extends the literature that has largely studied heterogeneous endowments under simultaneous play by adding a systematic analysis of heterogeneous endowments under sequential play.

Keywords: Endowment heterogeneity; Simultaneous moves；Sequential moves; Public goods; Theory; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mac
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