Politicized Trade: What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences?

Martin Gassebner and Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan

No 17-435, KOF Working papers from KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich

Abstract: While it is well understood that industrialized countries use aid to grantpolitical favors, little research covers alternative channels such as trade policytowards developing countries. We analyze eligibility investigations and revokingof U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits to see whetherpolitical friends of the U.S. receive favorable treatment. While countries politicallyaligned with the U.S. are equally likely to be investigated, they aresignificantly less likely to have their benefits suspended.

Keywords: Keywords: Development; Trade Policy; United Nations General Assembly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F53 O19 O24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2017-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000213817 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Politicized trade: What drives withdrawal of trade preferences? (2018)
Working Paper: Politicized Trade: What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences? (2017)
Working Paper: Politicized Trade: What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences? (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kof:wpskof:17-435

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