Politicized Trade: What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences?
Martin Gassebner () and
Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) from Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
While it is well understood that industrialized countries use aid to grant political favors, little research covers alternative channels such as trade policy towards developing countries. We analyze eligibility investigations and revoking of U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits to see whether political friends of the U.S. receive favorable treatment. While countries politically aligned with the U.S. are equally likely to be investigated, they are significantly less likely to have their benefits suspended.
Keywords: Trade Policy; Development; Generalized System of Preferences; United Nations General Assembly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F53 O19 O24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Politicized trade: What drives withdrawal of trade preferences? (2018)
Working Paper: Politicized Trade: What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences? (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-612
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