On Strategic Complementarities in Discontinuous Games with Totally Ordered Strategies
Pavlo Prokopovych and
Nicholas C. Yannelis
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Nicholas C. Yannelis: University of Iowa
No 56, Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics
This paper studies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered. By relaxing the conventional conditions related to upper semicontinuity and single crossing, we enlarge the class of games to which monotone techniques are applicable. The results are illustrated with a number of economics-related examples.
Keywords: Discontinuous game; Strategic complementarities; Better-reply security; Directional single crossing; Increasing correspondence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Journal Article: On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kse:dpaper:56
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